(2009) Husserl Studies 25 (3).

Bodily protentionality

Elizabeth Behnke

pp. 185-

This investigation explores the methodological implications of choosing an unusual example for phenomenological description (here, a bodily awareness practice allowing spontaneous bodily shifts to occur at the leading edge of the living present); for example, the matters themselves are not pregiven, but must first be brought into view. Only after preliminary clarifications not only of the practice concerned, but also of the very notions of the "body" and of "protentionality" is it possible to provide both static and genetic descriptions of the phenomena in question, leading to concluding meditations on the differences between an "integrating" consciousness engaged in a project of knowing and an "improvisational" consciousness open to radical transformation. In the end, however, the Urzeitigung in which what is protended is simply "more time" holds good as the invariant governing the deep structure of both of these styles of consciousness.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-009-9060-z

Full citation:

Behnke, E. (2009). Bodily protentionality. Husserl Studies 25 (3), pp. 185-.

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