(2015) Husserl Studies 31 (2).

On Husserl's alleged cartesianism and conjunctivism

a critical reply to Claude Romano

Andrea Staiti

pp. 123-141

In this paper I criticize Claude Romano's recent characterization of Husserl's phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can only characterize a temporary span of experience. Similarly, illusion is not a mode of experience in its own right but a retrospective way of characterizing a span of experience. Therefore, Husserl cannot be plausibly characterized as either a disjunctivist or a conjunctivist. The common premise of both theories – namely, that perception and illusion are two classes of conscious acts standing on equal footing – is phenomenologically unsound. I propose to call Husserl's theory a hermeneutical theory of perception, i.e., one that interprets perception as a temporal and self-correcting process. In the last part of the paper I argue that Husserl's positive appraisal of Cartesian doubt is only pedagogical in nature. Husserl does not take Cartesian doubt to be practicable, but the attempt to doubt universally has the positive effect of revealing transcendental subjectivity as the subject matter of phenomenology.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-014-9164-y

Full citation:

Staiti, A. (2015). On Husserl's alleged cartesianism and conjunctivism: a critical reply to Claude Romano. Husserl Studies 31 (2), pp. 123-141.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.