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(2002) Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husserl, Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Merleau-Ponty's ontological reading of constitution in Phénoménologie de la perception
Elizabeth Behnke
pp. 31-50
In Phénoménologie de la perception Merleau-Ponty constructs and critiques two notions of “constitution, ” both of which he ascribes to Husserl: an “intellectualist” sense that he rejects because it perpetuates a dualistic ontology of determinate being; and a “genetic” sense that is rejected on the grounds that it assumes an ultimately pre-given ontological matrix that it cannot itself provide. Thus Merleau-Ponty gives “constitution” an exclusively “metaphysical” reading, thereby occluding Husserl’s distinctive methodological sense of the term.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9944-3_2
Full citation:
Behnke, E. (2002)., Merleau-Ponty's ontological reading of constitution in Phénoménologie de la perception, in T. Toadvine & L. Embree (eds.), Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husserl, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 31-50.
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