First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness

Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology

Dan Zahavi

pp. 7-26

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

References

Persons and bodies: A constitution view

2000

Lynne Rudder Baker

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

The Oxford dictionary of philosophy

1994

Simon Blackburn (ed)

Oxford, Oxford University Press

Kant and the mind

1994

Andrew Brook

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Natural theories of consciousness

1998

Peter Carruthers

European Journal of Philosophy 6/2

Consciousness reconsidered

1994

Owen Flanagan

Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Bodily self-awareness and object perception

2003

Shaun Gallagher

Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 7/1

Selbstbewußtsein, kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie

1970

Dieter Henrich

in: Hermeneutik und Dialektik I., Tübingen : Mohr

Selbstverhältnisse

1982

Dieter Henrich

Stuttgart, Reclam

Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps

1965

Michel Henry

Paris, Presses universitaires de France

The view from nowhere

1986

Thomas Nagel

Oxford, Oxford University Press

A theory of consciousness

1997

David Rosenthal

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi

1948

Jean-Paul Sartre

Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 42

Being and nothingness

1956

Jean-Paul Sartre

New York, Philosophical Library

Intentionality

1983

John Searle

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Ten problems of consciousness

1995

Michael Tye

Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Brentano and Husserl on self-awareness

1998

Dan Zahavi

Études phénoménologiques 27/28

The fracture in self-awareness

1998

Dan Zahavi

in: Self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, Dordrecht : Kluwer

Self-awareness and affection

1998

Dan Zahavi

in: Alterity and facticity, Dordrecht : Kluwer

Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation

1999

Dan Zahavi

Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press

Self and consciousness

2000

Dan Zahavi

in: Exploring the self, Amsterdam : Benjamins

Phenomenology of self

2003

Dan Zahavi

in: The self in neuroscience and psychiatry, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.