Conflicting apprehensions and the question of sensations
Guided by problems of misperception, perceptual doubt, change and modification in a perceptual process, I ask in this essay whether there is a sensual base which may accomodate two different, even conflicting apprehensions I might have of — so it seems — the ‘same’ object. I will start by laying out the context of the question and by explicating the question itself. Then I will investigate this question by considering Husserl’s later works, in particular Die Analysen zur passiven Synthesis in which he not only advances a genetic analysis but also opens a way to discuss concepts which lie beyond such subjective achievements as sensorial complexes, affects, associations and motivations.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Schües, C. (1998)., Conflicting apprehensions and the question of sensations, in N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (eds.), Alterity and facticity, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 139-162.
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