Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness

A phenomenological critique of representational theory

Dan Zahavi, Josef Parnas

pp. 687-705

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self.

Publication details


Notice: Undefined offset: 1 in /home/clients/b010bcc84441ff7c5adbaf4e922effaa/web/ocoph/PubliView-Inc.php on line 583

DOI:

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Zahavi, D. , Parnas, J. (1998). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6), pp. 687-705.

References

The experience of the body-self in schizophrenia

1936

Andras Angyal

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 35

The Oxford dictionary of philosophy

1994

Simon Blackburn (ed)

Oxford, Oxford University Press

The phenomenological reduction as praxis

1999

Natalie Depraz

Journal of Consciousness Studies 6/2-3

Consciousness reconsidered

1994

Owen Flanagan

Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science

1997

Alvin Goldman

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

The many faces of consciousness: A field guide

1997

Güven Güzeldere

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht

1966

Dieter Henrich

in: Subjektivität und Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main : Klostermann

Selbstbewußtsein, kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie

1970

Dieter Henrich

in: Hermeneutik und Dialektik I., Tübingen : Mohr

Selbstverhältnisse

1982

Dieter Henrich

Stuttgart, Reclam

L'essence de la manifestation

1963

Michel Henry

Paris, Presses universitaires de France

Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps

1965

Michel Henry

Paris, Presses universitaires de France

Philosophie et subjectivité

1989

Michel Henry

in: Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle I, Paris : Presses universitaires de France

A treatise of human nature

1888

David Hume

Oxford, Clarendon Press

Epiphenomenal qualia

1982

Frank Jackson

Philosophical Quarterly 32

Selbstbewußtsein und Ich bei Husserl

1989

Iso Kern

in: Husserl-Symposion Mainz 1988, Stuttgart : Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur

Consciousness as internal monitoring

1997

William Lycan

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

Consciousness and content

1997

Colin McGinn

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

What is it like to be a bat?

1974

Thomas Nagel

The Philosophical Review 83

The view from nowhere

1986

Thomas Nagel

Oxford, Oxford University Press

Reasons and persons

1987

Derek Parfit

Oxford, Clarendon Press

A theory of consciousness

1997

David Rosenthal

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

The rediscovery of the mind

1992

John Searle

Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Self-reference and self-awareness

1968

Sydney Shoemaker

The Journal of Philosophy 65

Individuals

1959

Peter Strawson

London, Methuen

Mental reality

1994

Galen Strawson

Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

The self

1997

Galen Strawson

Journal of Consciousness Studies 4/5-6

Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos

1997

Robert Van Gulick

in: The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press

Brentano and Husserl on self-awareness

1998

Dan Zahavi

Études phénoménologiques 14/27-28

The fracture in self-awareness

1998

Dan Zahavi

in: Self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, Dordrecht : Kluwer

Self-awareness and affection

1998

Dan Zahavi

in: Alterity and facticity, Dordrecht : Kluwer

Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation

1999

Dan Zahavi

Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.