Mental transparency, direct sensation, and the unity of the cartesian mind
An old question continues to rankle: Does Descartes hold that external objects are cognized only indirectly, by means of our directly cognizing some form of representative stand-in? Does he subscribe, in other words, to a "veil of perception" account of cognition?1 The view that he does, in one form or another, has been defended by many scholars,2 as has the view that he does not,3 in one form or another, with the latter generally addressing "primary" qualities. In this paper I examine the following (style of) argument, which has provided much impetus for the "veil" camp, particularly with respect to 'secondary" qualities:
Pessin, A. (2009)., Mental transparency, direct sensation, and the unity of the cartesian mind, in J. Miller (ed.), Topics in early modern philosophy of mind, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1-37.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.