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Contemporary analytical philosophy is replete with philosophical distinctions. Such is, for better or for worse, the result of the systematically performing conceptual analysis in a piecemeal way. The results are not always enchanting. Very often, we find that some of those distinctions are not well motivated or that they could be reduced to other previously introduced distinctions. This was, for instance, the case with the so called distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. As Kripke has shown, the distinction turned out to be unmotivated as a semantic distinction, since it could be handled by exploiting already existing semantic resources such as the de re / de dicto distinction or the one between the small scope and wide scope of quantifiers.¹ It could also be shown that if a language contains no singular terms, and if Russell's theory of descriptions can be maintained, the distinction between de re / de dicto reports and the distinction between small scope / wide scope occurrences of quantifiers amount to the same thing. Philosophical distinctions can, up to a certain point, be useful tools for the analytical philosopher, but she must sooner or later be ready for a more synthetic approach. Otherwise, we run the risk of losing sight of the more general philosophical picture. By always looking at the trees, we run the risk of losing sight of the forest.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5_15

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