The ideality of meaning in Husserl
This essay opposes the naturalistic point of view, e.g., Quine's, with regard to meaning in general. To show my own point of view, I examine Husserl's transcendentalism as revealed in his theory of meaning. Questions about objectivity and phenomenological methodology are mentioned, but in subsidiary concern. Quine's denial of meaning may be shown to undermine the basis of his claim of a firm core of empricism. Whenever he talks about "perceptual similarity" he can not help relying upon the subjective standpoint of unifying meaning that he rejects.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Okamoto, Y. (1993)., The ideality of meaning in Husserl, in P. Blosser, E. Shimomissé, L. Embree & H. Kojima (eds.), Japanese and Western phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 37-54.
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