The phenomenologically manifest

Uriah Kriegel

pp. 115-136

Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call "the method of contrast" and "the method of knowability."

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9029-8

Full citation:

Kriegel, U. (2007). The phenomenologically manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2), pp. 115-136.

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